Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon

Control Channel Toolkit: A Software Product Line Case Study

Managing the CCT Effort

The management of a product line effort, especially when the effort marks a departure from the standard approach to software development, requires sophisticated management skills and well-honed leadership qualities. Clements and Northrop lay out a healthy collection of technical management practice areas and an even larger collection of organizational management practice areas [Clements 01]. We have already described the CCT practices for a good number of these areas. The technical management practices and the management style are most notable.

First, we focus on technical management. Raytheon’s process sophistication and discipline resulted in superb execution of CCT’s technical management activities. Processes for technical planning, configuration management, technical risk management, process definition, data collection, metrics and tracking, make/buy/mine/commission analysis, scoping, and testing were stitched into the fabric of the CCT development process. There were very few process snags throughout the entire CCT development process, and none that weren’t handled¾ which brings us to the management style of those at the helm of CCT.

During the feasibility study prior to the CCT official launch, the entire NRO management chain responsible for CCT supported strategic reuse. They could all be described as visionaries. They all recognized the unnecessary duplication and risk involved in stand-alone efforts for similar spacecraft systems. They all were open to the changes that a product line approach would necessitate in terms of the organizational and technical practices to which they were accustomed. They stayed the course and provided unwavering support.1

In particular, the CCT Program Office manager, John Ohlinger, was deeply committed to the success of a product line approach. He maintained a loose, relaxed management style, providing sufficient direction while being flexible enough to hear ideas, bring in experts, and respond midstream to perceived needs. For example, early on he became convinced of the need for a greater focus on the architecture in order for CCT to succeed. He altered the original plan to incorporate two architecture evaluations despite some dissention within his office and the contractor team. He then formed the CCT Architecture Group to address the evaluation findings and to continue to shine a light on architectural issues and their resolution.

His counterpart, Jeff Shaw, Raytheon’s CCT program manager, was a high-energy individual and a firm believer not only in software product lines but also in the ability of his team to deliver the CCT asset base. His enthusiasm was contagious. His support was obvious in the way he treated his staff and handled their needs. He was structured and well organized, a superb communicator who made others in his organization into CCT believers. Both he and Ohlinger had a great deal of technical savvy and experience in the spacecraft command and control domain. Ohlinger’s and Shaw’s styles were complementary; together they provided a protective shield and a supportive environment for the CCT development team. They didn’t just manage; they led.

Close to CCT completion, Jeff Shaw was reassigned. His deputy assumed his responsibilities and applied her own leadership skills to complete the CCT effort on time and within budget.  

 

 

 

1 Near the completion of the CCT effort, those in the NRO chain of command above the CCT Program Office moved on, one by one. As others filled their ranks, the support for the effort diminished.  

 

 

 


[Title Page]     [Abstract]     [Figures]     [1 Introduction]    
[2 Contextual Background]     [3 Launching CCT]    
[4 Engineering the CCT Core Assets]     [5 Managing the CCT Effort]    
[6 Early Benefits from CCT]     [7 Lessons and Issues]     [8 Summary]    
[References]     [DTIC page]     [PDF file]