

# **CDGym: Expandable, Model-Agnostic Cyber Deception Platform**

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# Game-Theoretic Cyber Deception

- Deception decreases or reverses strategic asymmetries
- Game theory provides generic framework for quantifying actions/reactions, rewards/penalties
- Previous works have been focusing on leveraging game theory to devise deception strategies and implement in real-world networks

# Current Challenges

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
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  - Measurability: It is difficult to collect data.
  - Adaptability: Each strategy requires different configurations.


# CDGym

- SDN-based cyber deception platform.




# CDGym

- Reproducibility: Automated deployment, configuration, and termination of the network through SDN.




# CDGym

- Measurability: Real-time data collection module.





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
- Adaptability: Design and implement unified configuration language.




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# Unified Configuration Language




# Unified Configuration Language



$$N' = \{n'_1, n'_2, \dots, n'_k \mid n'_k = (w', n'_{adj})\},$$

where  $(w' \in \mathbb{Q}) \wedge (n'_{adj} \sim n')$

AND

$$E' = \{(n'_i, n'_j) \mid n'_i \in N' \wedge n'_j \in N'\}$$

$$\text{Flow rule (F)} = \{(n_{src}, n_{dst}) \mid n_{src}, n_{dst} \in N\},$$

# Unified Configuration Language



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
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    - D3\*\*\*: static honeypot placement strategy using priority scores assigned to each node (asset) in the network.

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
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# Evaluation of *CDGym*



```
<node id="46">
<data key="439">1</data>
<data key="439">52.11879</data>
<data key="431">Canada</data>
<data key="432">City</data>
<data key="433">46</data>
<data key="434">106.63452</data>
<data key="435">Saskatoon</data>
</node>
<node id="47">
<data key="439">1</data>
<data key="439">50.45008</data>
<data key="431">Canada</data>
<data key="432">City</data>
<data key="433">47</data>
<data key="434">104.6178</data>
<data key="435">Regina</data>
</node>
<edge source="0" target="2">
<data key="436">Fiber</data>
<data key="437">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
<data key="438">Bell Canada Routes</data>
<data key="439">0</data>
</edge>
<edge source="1" target="2">
<data key="436">Fiber</data>
<data key="437">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
<data key="438">Bell Canada Routes</data>
<data key="439">0</data>
</edge>
<edge source="2" target="6">
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<data key="437">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
<data key="438">Bell Canada Routes</data>
<data key="439">0</data>
</edge>
<edge source="2" target="3">
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<data key="437">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
<data key="438">Bell Canada Routes</data>
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</edge>
<edge source="2" target="4">
<data key="436">Fiber</data>
<data key="437">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
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</edge>
```



→

Real-world Network


Network  
Topology  
(graphxml)

Simulated  
Network


# Evaluation of *CDGym*

- Data metrics
  - Scanning Time
  - Number of Scanning Attempts
  - Number of exploits
  - Number of IDS alarms
  - Commands typed


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
(a) Number of Network Scans



(b) Number of Host Scans




(c) Number of Exploit Attempts and Successful Exploits




(d) Proportion of Time Spent on Reconnaissance


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
(a) Behavior Analysis with Non-Deceptive Network



(b) Behavior Analysis with D1



(c) Behavior Analysis with D2



(d) Behavior Analysis with D3

# Future Work

- Support for host-based deception measures.
- Behavioral analysis features.

# Conclusion

- Application of game-theoretic cyber deception in real-world environments suffers from the lack of reproducibility, measurability, and adaptability.
- We designed and implemented *CDGym*, a generic and model-agnostic platform that addresses the challenges.
- *CDGym* is capable of analyzing network-based deception strategies.

# Thank you!