

***CDGym*: Expandable, Model-Agnostic Cyber Deception Platform**

Sukwha Kyung, Siyu Liu, Faris Kokulu, Tiffany Bao, and Gail-Joon Ahn

Arizona State University



Game-Theoretic Cyber Deception

- Deception decreases or reverses strategic asymmetries
- Game theory provides generic framework for quantifying actions/reactions, rewards/penalties
- Previous works have been focusing on leveraging game theory to devise deception strategies and implement in real-world networks

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
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 - Measurability: It is difficult to collect data.
 - Adaptability: Each strategy requires different configurations.


CDGym

- SDN-based cyber deception platform.




CDGym

- Reproducibility: Automated deployment, configuration, and termination of the network through SDN.




CDGym

- Measurability: Real-time data collection module.





CDGym

- Adaptability: Design and implement unified configuration language.



CDGym



Unified Configuration Language

Camouflage /Signaling

Given any node n in N , n has $TC = \{tc_1, tc_2, \dots, tc_k \mid$
 $tc_k = [conf_1, conf_2, \dots, conf_k]\}$
AND
 $FC = \{fc_1, fc_2, \dots, fc_k \mid fc_k = [conf'_1, conf'_2, \dots, conf'_k]\}$,
where fc is a set of all available configurations that
can be used for camouflaged.

Decoy

$H_{fc} = \{h_1, h_2, \dots, h_k \mid h_k = (t_k, [n_1, n_2, \dots, n_k])\}$,
where $h_k \sim [n_1, n_2, \dots, n_k]$

Unified Configuration Language


Topology Manipulation

$$\begin{aligned} N' &= \{n'_1, n'_2, \dots, n'_k \mid n'_k = (w', n'_{\text{adj}})\}, \\ &\text{where } (w' \in \mathbb{Q}) \wedge (n'_{\text{adj}} \sim n') \\ &\text{AND} \\ E' &= \{(n'_i, n'_j) \mid n'_i \in N' \wedge n'_j \in N'\} \end{aligned}$$

Flow Manipulation

$$\text{Flow rule } (F) = \{(n_{\text{src}}, n_{\text{dst}}) \mid n_{\text{src}}, n_{\text{dst}} \in N\},$$

Unified Configuration Language



Evaluation of *CDGym*

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
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 - D3***: static honeypot placement strategy using priority scores assigned to each node (asset) in the network.

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
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***: Radek Píbil, Viliam Lisý, Christopher Kiekintveld, Branislav Bošanský, and Michal Pěchouček. **Game theoretic model of strategic honeypot selection in computer networks**. In International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, pages 201–220. Springer, 2012.

Evaluation of *CDGym*



```
<node id="46">
  <data key="d29">1</data>
  <data key="d30">52.11679</data>
  <data key="d31">Canada</data>
  <data key="d32">City</data>
  <data key="d33">46</data>
  <data key="d34">106.63452</data>
  <data key="d35">Saskatoon</data>
</node>
<node id="47">
  <data key="d29">1</data>
  <data key="d30">50.45008</data>
  <data key="d31">Canada</data>
  <data key="d32">City</data>
  <data key="d33">47</data>
  <data key="d34">104.6178</data>
  <data key="d35">Regina</data>
</node>
<edge source="0" target="2">
  <data key="d36">Fiber</data>
  <data key="d37">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
  <data key="d38">Bell Canada Routes</data>
  <data key="d39">0</data>
</edge>
<edge source="1" target="2">
  <data key="d36">Fiber</data>
  <data key="d37">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
  <data key="d38">Bell Canada Routes</data>
  <data key="d39">0</data>
</edge>
<edge source="1" target="6">
  <data key="d36">Fiber</data>
  <data key="d37">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
  <data key="d38">Bell Canada Routes</data>
  <data key="d39">0</data>
</edge>
<edge source="2" target="3">
  <data key="d36">Fiber</data>
  <data key="d37">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
  <data key="d38">Bell Canada Routes</data>
  <data key="d39">0</data>
</edge>
<edge source="2" target="4">
  <data key="d36">Fiber</data>
  <data key="d37">Bell Canada Fiber Routes</data>
  <data key="d38">Bell Canada Routes</data>
  <data key="d39">0</data>
</edge>
```



Real-world Network


Network
Topology
(graphxml)

Simulated
Network


Evaluation of *CDGym*

- Data metrics
 - Scanning Time
 - Number of Scanning Attempts
 - Number of exploits
 - Number of IDS alarms
 - Commands typed


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
(a) Number of Network Scans



(b) Number of Host Scans




(c) Number of Exploit Attempts and Successful Exploits




(d) Proportion of Time Spent on Reconnaissance


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
(a) Behavior Analysis with Non-Deceptive Network



(b) Behavior Analysis with D1



(c) Behavior Analysis with D2



(d) Behavior Analysis with D3

Future Work

- Support for host-based deception measures.
- Behavioral analysis features.

Conclusion

- Application of game-theoretic cyber deception in real-world environments suffers from the lack of reproducibility, measurability, and adaptability.
- We designed and implemented *CDGym*, a generic and model-agnostic platform that addresses the challenges.
- *CDGym* is capable of analyzing network-based deception strategies.

Thank you!