Insider Threat Control: Using Universal Serial Bus (USB) Device Auditing to Detect Possible Data Exfiltration by Malicious Insiders

Universal serial bus (USB) storage devices are useful for transferring information within an organization; however, they are a common threat vector through which data exfiltration can occur. Despite this, many organizations permit the use of USB devices on their systems. Implementing controls to track the use of these devices is necessary if organizations wish to retain situational awareness and auditing capabilities during a data theft incident.

This report presents methods to audit USB device use within a Microsoft Windows environment. Using various tools-the Windows Task Scheduler, batch scripts, Trend Micro's OSSEC host-based intrusion-detection system (HIDS), and the Splunk log analysis engine-we explore means by which information technology (IT) professionals can centrally log and monitor USB device use on Microsoft Windows hosts within an organization. In addition, we discuss how the central collection of audit logs can aid in determining whether sensitive data may have been copied from a system by a malicious insider.

PDF [299 KB]

Authors

George Silowash

Todd Lewellen

This report is related to the following area(s) of work:

Security and Survivability

Technical Note
CMU/SEI-2013-TN-003
January 2013

Cite This Report

SEI:

Silowash, George; & Lewellen, Todd. Insider Threat Control: Using Universal Serial Bus (USB) Device Auditing to Detect Possible Data Exfiltration by Malicious Insiders (CMU/SEI-2013-TN-003). Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 2013. http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/13tn003.cfm

IEEE:

G. Silowash, and T. Lewellen, "Insider Threat Control: Using Universal Serial Bus (USB) Device Auditing to Detect Possible Data Exfiltration by Malicious Insiders," Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Technical Note CMU/SEI-2013-TN-003, 2013. http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/13tn003.cfm

APA:

Silowash, G., & Lewellen, T. (2013). Insider Threat Control: Using Universal Serial Bus (USB) Device Auditing to Detect Possible Data Exfiltration by Malicious Insiders (CMU/SEI-2013-TN-003). Retrieved June 19, 2013, from the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University website: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/13tn003.cfm

CHI:

Silowash, George, and Todd Lewellen. Insider Threat Control: Using Universal Serial Bus (USB) Device Auditing to Detect Possible Data Exfiltration by Malicious Insiders (CMU/SEI-2013-TN-003). Pittsburgh, PA: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 2013. http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/13tn003.cfm

MLA:

Silowash, G., & Lewellen, T. 2013. Insider Threat Control: Using Universal Serial Bus (USB) Device Auditing to Detect Possible Data Exfiltration by Malicious Insiders (Technical Report CMU/SEI-2013-TN-003). Pittsburgh: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/13tn003.cfm

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