Deriving Candidate Technical Controls and Indicators of Insider Attack from Socio-Technical Models and Data
The insider threat continues to be one of the prime issues facing government entities and organizations across critical infrastructure sectors. Extensive catalogues of case material from actual insider events have been used by CERT, part of Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute, to create socio-technical models of insider crime to help educate organizations on the risk of insider crime. Building upon this work, this paper seeks to demonstrate how a useful method for extracting technical information from previous insider crimes and mapping it to previous modeling work can create informed candidate technical controls and indicators. This paper also shows current examples of case material and candidate indicators that have been successfully converted into well-received insider threat training modules.
This report is related to the following area(s) of work:
Security and SurvivabilityTechnical Note
CMU/SEI-2011-TN-003
January 2011
Cite This Report
SEI:
Hanley, Michael; Deriving Candidate Technical Controls and Indicators of Insider Attack from Socio-Technical Models and Data (CMU/SEI-2011-TN-003). Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 2011. http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/11tn003.cfm
IEEE:
M. Hanley, "Deriving Candidate Technical Controls and Indicators of Insider Attack from Socio-Technical Models and Data," Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Technical Note CMU/SEI-2011-TN-003, 2011. http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/11tn003.cfm
APA:
Hanley, M., (2011). Deriving Candidate Technical Controls and Indicators of Insider Attack from Socio-Technical Models and Data (CMU/SEI-2011-TN-003). Retrieved May 21, 2013, from the Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University website: http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/11tn003.cfm
CHI:
Hanley, Michael, Deriving Candidate Technical Controls and Indicators of Insider Attack from Socio-Technical Models and Data (CMU/SEI-2011-TN-003). Pittsburgh, PA: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, 2011. http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/11tn003.cfm
MLA:
Hanley, M., 2011. Deriving Candidate Technical Controls and Indicators of Insider Attack from Socio-Technical Models and Data (Technical Report CMU/SEI-2011-TN-003). Pittsburgh: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University. http://www.sei.cmu.edu/library/abstracts/reports/11tn003.cfm
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