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SEI Study Analyzes Applicability of Security and Zero Trust Principles to Weapon Systems

SEI Study Analyzes Applicability of Security and Zero Trust Principles to Weapon Systems
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October 27, 2025—The Department of War (DoW) is mandated to begin adopting zero-trust (ZT) cybersecurity practices for its weapon systems and operational technology. The ZT approach, which authenticates every interaction in a network, applies most directly to enterprise information technology (EIT) and does not easily translate to weapon systems and defense critical infrastructure. A recent study by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) analyzes the applicability of nine security and ZT principles to weapon systems and the resulting security risks and tradeoffs.

Different Environments, Different Risks

In a ZT architecture, every user, application, system, and device is untrusted by default, and every request to access computing resources must be authenticated. This proactive, data-centric approach reduces an organization’s attack surface and enhances threat detection, response, resilience, and adaptability.

In late 2024, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) Cyber Resiliency Office for Weapon Systems (CROWS) asked the SEI to explore how foundational cybersecurity and ZT principles created for general-use computing and networks would apply to weapon systems. “Enterprise IT and weapons systems are very different environments, and they entail different risks and trade-offs,” said Chris Alberts, an SEI principal engineer and senior cybersecurity analyst and principal investigator of the CROWS project. “Our study looked at how the Air Force can start thinking about which risks and trade-offs are most important when applying zero trust to aircraft and other weapon systems.”

Weighing Security and Performance Tradeoffs

The SEI report Tailoring Security and Zero Trust Principles to Weapon System Environments analyzes how ZT principles, such as least privilege and presume breach, are applied in EIT environments and presents special considerations for their application in weapon systems. It also provides questions that system engineers should ask when weighing the tradeoffs between security practices and their potential impacts on the weapon system’s performance and interoperability, as well as on the program’s costs and schedule.

For example, some ZT actions, such as authentication and encryption, can increase execution latency, which can greatly impact real-time systems. “If you have very precise timing requirements related to mission objectives, then you could have system performance issues that could ultimately degrade or lead to mission failure,” said Alberts.

Alberts noted that the challenge of transitioning operational technology environments to a ZT architecture goes beyond weapon systems to all critical infrastructure. But unlike many pieces of operational technology, a weapon system often supports multiple missions. Different mission environments may entail different security requirements and risk mitigations to ensure mission success.

Filling the Zero Trust Guidance Gap

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 mandated ZT implementation in the DoW’s information enterprise, operational technology, and weapon systems. The department is on its way to meeting a 2027 ZT deadline for its EIT. This environment has well-documented guidance on the major shifts needed for authentication, authorization, and security controls. But for the specialized, real-time environments of weapon systems, defense programs face a dearth of guidance on how to adopt EIT-focused security principles.

The SEI’s new study is a first attempt to fill that gap. The institute has evolved security engineering for decades, provided ZT guidance for several Air Force and DoW EIT environments and for Army tactical networks, and evaluated software and cybersecurity for the Sentinel, Long Range Standoff (LRSO), and F-35 programs. This experience enabled the SEI’s CROWS project team to create a foundational mapping of nine bedrock cybersecurity and ZT principles to the unique requirements of weapon systems.

The CROWS project marks an early stage in the Air Force’s ZT journey beyond enterprise IT. Alberts believes the principles-to-tradeoffs mapping could evolve into a framework for applying ZT practices in real-time environments. “This is a first step on the path towards developing more tangible solutions that programs can directly apply.”

Download Tailoring Security and Zero Trust Principles to Weapon System Environments from the SEI’s Digital Library. Learn more about the SEI’s secure development work in the SEI Blog.

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